This paper presents a MaxSAT benchmark focused on identifying critical nodes in AND/OR graphs. We use AND/OR graphs to model Industrial Control Systems (ICS) as they are able to semantically grasp intricate logical interdependencies among ICS components. However, identifying critical nodes in AND/OR graphs is an NP-complete problem. We address this problem by efficiently transforming the input AND/OR graph-based model into a weighted logical formula that is then used to build and solve a Weighted Partial MaxSAT problem. The benchmark includes 80 cases with AND/OR graphs of different size and composition as well as the optimal cost and solution for each case.
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I. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
Over the last years, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as water treatment plants and energy facilities have become increasingly exposed to a wide range of cyber-physical threats, having massive destructive consequences. Our work is focused on security metrics and techniques that can be used to measure and improve the security posture of ICS environments [1] . We use AND/OR graphs to model these systems as they allow more realistic representations of the complex interdependencies among cyber-physical components that are normally involved in real-world settings [2] , [3] . In that context, we have designed a security metric, detailed in [1] , whose objective is to identify the set of critical AND/OR nodes (ICS network components) that must be compromised in order to disrupt the operation of the system, with minimal cost for the attacker.
From a graph-theoretical perspective, our security metric looks for a minimal weighted vertex cut in AND/OR graphs. This is an NP-complete problem as shown in [3] , [4] , [5] . While well-known algorithms such as Max-flow Min-cut [6] and variants of it could be used to estimate such metric over OR graphs in polynomial time, their use for general AND/OR graphs is not evident nor trivial as they may fail to capture the underlying logical semantics of the graph. In that context, we take advantage of state-of-the-art MaxSAT techniques to address our problem.
II. SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Let us consider a simple ICS network whose operational dependencies are represented by the AND/OR graph shown in Figure 1 . The graph reads as follows: the actuator c1 depends on the output of software agent d. Agent d in turn has two alternatives to work properly; it can use either the readings of sensor a and the output from agent b together, or the output from agent b and the readings of sensor c together. In addition, each cyber-physical component has an associated attack cost that represents the effort required by an attacker to compromise that component. Now, considering these costs, the question we are trying to answer is: which nodes should be compromised in order to disrupt the operation of actuator c1, with minimal effort (cost) for the attacker? In other words, what is the leasteffort attack strategy to disable actuator c1? Our example involves many attack alternatives, however, only one is minimal. The optimal strategy is to compromise nodes a and c with a total cost of 4. The compromise of these sensors will disable both AND nodes and consecutively the OR node, which in turn will affect node d and finally node c1.
III. MAXSAT FORMULATION STRATEGY
Given a target node t, the input graph G can be used as a map to decode the dependencies that node t relies on. Therefore, G can be traversed backwards in order to produce a propositional formula that represents the different ways in which node t can be fulfilled. We call this transformation f G (t). In our example, f G (c1) is as follows:
The goal of the attacker, however, is precisely the opposite, i.e., to disrupt node c1 somewhere along the graph. Therefore, we are actually interested in satisfying ¬f G (c1), which describes the means to disable c1. After applying a few logical rules, the conjunctive normal form (CNF) of ¬f G (c1) is:
In practice, we do not use the naive CNF conversion approach since it might lead to exponential computation times over large graphs. Instead, we use the Tseitin transformation [7] , which can be done in polynomial time and essentially produces a new formula in CNF that is not strictly equivalent to the original formula (because there are new variables) but is equisatisfiable. This means that, given an assignment of truth values, the new formula is satisfied if and only if the original formula is also satisfied. Under that perspective, a logical assignment such that ¬f G (t) = true will indicate which nodes must be compromised (i.e. logically falsified) in order to disrupt the operation of the system.
Considering the CNF formula produced by the Tseitin transformation and a cost function ϕ(n) that indicates the attack cost of a node n, we model our problem as a Weighted Partial MaxSAT problem [8] . Hard clauses are essentially the clauses within the CNF formula: ¬c1 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬a ∨ ¬b ¬c1 ∨ ¬d ∨ ¬b ∨ ¬c whereas soft clauses correspond to each atomic node in the graph with their corresponding penalties (costs) as follows:
Therefore, a MaxSAT solver will try to minimise the number of falsified variables as well as their weights, which in our problem equals to minimise the compromise cost for the attacker. Note: the additional variables introduced by the Tseitin transformation have cost/weight 0 in the formulation.
IV. AND/OR GRAPH GENERATION
The benchmark presented in this paper relies on META4ICS, a Java-based security metric analyser for ICS [1] , [9] . We have used META4ICS to produce and analyse synthetic pseudo-random AND/OR graphs of different size and composition. To create an AND/OR graph of size n, we first create the target node. Afterwards, we create a predecessor which has one of the three types (atomic, AND, OR) according to a probability given by a compositional configuration predefined for the experiment. For example, a configuration of (60, 20, 20) means 60% of atomic nodes, 20% of AND nodes and 20% of OR nodes. We repeat this process creating children on the respective nodes until we approximate the desired size of the graph n. Node costs, represented by ϕ(n), are integer values randomly selected between 1 and 100.
The benchmark also includes the solutions obtained by META4ICS for each case, including resolution time, total cost and critical nodes. Currently, META4ICS uses SAT4J [10] and a Python-based linear programming approach as MaxSAT solvers. The tool runs all available solvers in parallel and picks the first one that comes up with a valid solution.
V. BENCHMARK DESCRIPTION
Out dataset includes 80 cases in total, and can be obtained at [9] . There are four different sizes of AND/OR graphs involving 5000, 10000, 15000, and 20000 nodes (20 cases each). For each graph size, we consider two different graph configurations, 80/10/10 and 60/20/20, which determine the composition of the graphs (10 cases each). Table I shows the identifiers of the cases within each one of these categories. Each case is specified in an individual .wcnf (DIMACS-like, weighted CNF) file named with the case id and the number of nodes involved. The weight for hard clauses (top value) has been set to 1.0 × 10 6 . Tables II and III detail each case as well as the results obtained with our tool. The field id identifies each case; gNodes indicates the total number of nodes in the original AND/OR graph; gAT, gAND and gOR indicate the approximate composition of the graph in terms of atomic (cyber-physical components), AND and OR nodes; tsVars and tsClauses show the number of variables and clauses involved in the MaxSAT formulation after applying the Tseitin transformation; cost and time show the total solution cost reported by META4ICS and the time needed for its resolution in milliseconds; solution shows the set of critical nodes expressed as a list of nodes with their respective costs (weights). These experiments have performed on a MacBook Pro (15inch, 2018), 2.9 GHz Intel Core i9, 32 GB 2400 MHz DDR4.
As a final remark, it can be observed that some cases with the same size and composition parameters have very different resolution times. This is an interesting phenomenon and it is due to the internal logical composition of the AND/OR graph and how well the underlying solver performs with each case. Within our experiments, we have observed that none of the two solvers used in META4ICS is faster than the other in all of the cases. We believe this is an interesting problem that should be further investigated in the context of MaxSAT solvers. 
